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DOES DUE PROCESS HAVE AN AGE LIMIT?  WHY THE LAW 
CONCERNING THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
INTIMATE ASSOCIATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ADULT 
CHILD IS A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT  
 
Bryan Schenkman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
It would not be an understatement to acknowledge the 
profound impact that the formation and preservation of deep 
interpersonal relationships can have in shaping an individual's 
morals, values, knowledge, life choices, and overall happiness.1  
Generally, the relationship between a parent, or a parental figure, and 
a child, is one of the most influential relationships in a person's life.2  
Typically, the parent-child relationship will commence at birth, 
continue throughout the years the child is considered a minor, and 
remain long after the child reaches the age of majority.3  However, 
throughout the entire existence of the relationship, the nature of the 
parent-child relationship will naturally evolve as the child ages.  
From the moment of birth through the age of minority, a child will 
 
* Bryan M. Schenkman is a recent graduate of Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg 
Law Center and former Managing Editor of the Touro Law Review. He dedicates 
this Note to his grandmother, Rhoda Damsky, who passed away while he was in 
the process of drafting this Note.   
1 Debra Umberson, and Jennifer Karas Montez, Social Relationships and Health: A 
Flashpoint for Health Policy, JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, vol. 
51, no. 1 suppl., 54 (2010). 
2 Eleanor Maccoby, Parenting and its Effects on Children: On Reading and 
Misreading Behavior Genetics, Volume 51, ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY, 3 
(2000). 
3 Kira Birditt, ET AL., Tensions in the Parent and Adult Child Relationship: Links to 
Solidarity and Ambivalence, PSYCHOL AGING, 2 (2009), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2690709/pdf/nihms-94367.pdf. 
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generally be reliant on a parent for nurture, guidance, and care.4  
Gradually, the relationship evolves as the child ages and becomes 
less reliant on the parents or parental figures.5  However, while the 
relationship between a parent and a minor child may be inherently 
different from the relationship between a parent and an adult child, 
should it also be presumed that the strength of the bond and level of 
intimacy in the parent-child relationship changes as well?  Currently, 
it would appear as though the law is divisive on the answer to that 
question.  
It would not be far-fetched to characterize the issue of 
whether the relationship between a parent and an adult child should 
be afforded constitutional protection under the right to freedom of 
intimate association, as "a circuit split."  While the United States 
Supreme Court has previously found that the right to freedom of 
intimate association affords parents a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in the relationship with their children, Supreme Court 
precedent is limited to cases involving the relationship between a 
parent and a minor child.6  Indeed, a case involving the question of 
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the 
relationship with an adult child would present a novel issue at the 
Supreme Court level.  Yet, although there is a lack of Supreme Court 
precedent, several circuits in the United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeal have decided the issue of whether the relationship between a 
parent and an adult child is entitled to constitutional protection.  
While the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have found that the right 
to freedom of intimate association affords parents a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in the relationship with their adult children,7 
 
4 Romana Kaleem, Towards the Recognition of a Parental Right of Companionship 
in Adult Children Under the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process 
Clause, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1121, 1146-48 (2005). 
5 Id.  
6 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the due 
process clause protects parents’ right to raise their children “establish a home”); 
Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that parents have the 
fundamental right to companionship with their children and to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing that parents have a “fundamental 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, control and 
management of their children.”). 
7 See, e.g., Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2002); Smith v. City of 
Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by 
2
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the First, Third, Seventh, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, 
have yet to find that a parent was deprived of a cognizable 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in cases where the child was 
an adult.8  
Indeed, based on the decisions by the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, it would appear that the circuits disagree as to 
whether a parental liberty interest exists in relationships between 
parents and adult children.  Yet, even in the absence of Supreme 
Court precedent, it is apparent, based upon Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, that a child's age should not be a dispositive 
factor nor even a consideration, in determining whether a parent-child 
relationship should be entitled to receive constitutional protection.  
Additionally, based on the decisions of the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, the lack of uniformity among the circuits as to 
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the 
relationship with an adult child is a mischaracterization of a circuit 
split.  In other words, the purported circuit split is not the result of 
divergent opinions among the circuits as to whether a parental liberty 
interest in the relationship with an adult child exists.  
The First, Third, Seventh, Eleventh and District of Columbia 
Circuits' findings that the parents did not suffer an unconstitutional 
deprivation of their right to freedom of intimate association was not 
due to the child's age, barring the existence of a parental liberty 
interest.  Rather, it is due to the fact that state actors' conduct did not 
rise to the level of an unconstitutional deprivation.9  However, even 
 
Hodgers-Durgin v. d la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999); Trujillo v. 
Bd. of Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cty., 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-91 (10th Cir. 1985).  
8 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1986); McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 
F.3d 820, 830-31 (3d Cir. 2003); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Robertson v. 
Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005). 
9 See Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10 (holding that the court would not extend a due process 
violation from a “government action directly aimed at the relationship between a 
parent and young child to an incidental deprivation” the relationship between a 
parent and an adult child); see also McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830 (holding in part 
that,“[it] would stretch the concept of due process too far if we were to recognize a 
constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the 
parent-child relationship.); Russ, 414 F.3d at 790 (holding that a finding of a 
constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the 
parent-child relationship would “stretch the concept of due process far beyond the 
guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court.”). 
3
Schenkman: Does Due Process Have an Age Limit?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1086 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits would have likely reached that 
same conclusion under those circumstances.10  Thus, while on its 
face, it appears that there exists a circuit split as to whether a child's 
age bars a parent from having a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in the relationship with his or her child, no circuit has 
actually found that a parental liberty interest does not exist based 
solely on the child's age.11  Therefore, based on the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the 
decisions of each of the circuits, a child's age should not be a factor in 
determining whether a relationship is entitled to constitutional 
protection and the purported lack of consensus among the United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals is a mischaracterization of a circuit 
split.   
This Note argues that, based on the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the 
decisions of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, a child's age 
should not be a dispositive factor in determining the existence of a 
constitutionally protected parental liberty interest, and the purported 
lack of consensus among the circuits is a mischaracterization of a 
circuit split.  This Note proposes that in cases involving the question 
of whether parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
the relationship with their children, the United States Supreme Court 
and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have based their 
decisions on the strength of the bond in their relationship rather than 
the child’s age.  The author describes how the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the right to freedom of intimate association and how the 
decisions of each of the circuits have adhered to the Supreme Court's 
interpretation, while also remaining consistent with one another 
irrespective of the fact that the cases at the circuit court level resulted 
in different outcomes.  
 
10 See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190 (holding in part that a finding of an 
unconstitutional deprivation is appropriate only if the state actor’s conduct was 
directed at that right); Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 
373 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that there was no violation of the plaintiffs’ right to 
freedom of intimate association when the police officers accidentally shot and 
killed the plaintiffs’ adult son and brother); Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 910 
F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that a claim under the Due Process Clause for 
infringement of the right to familial associations requires the allegation that state 
action was specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship). 
11 See Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830; Robertson, 420 F.3d at 
1258; Butera, 235 F.3d at 656. 
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Section II provides an overview of the right to freedom of 
intimate association and its application in a federal action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  Section III explores the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association.  In 
Section IV, the author analyzes the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the right to freedom of intimate association,and evaluates how the 
Supreme Court would decide a case involving the question of 
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a 
relationship with an adult child.  Section V reviews the cases and the 
decisions of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, addressing 
the question of whether a parental right to freedom of intimate 
association exists in the relationship with an adult child.  The author 
will conclude in Section VI, that based on the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the 
decisions of each of the circuits, a child's age should not be a factor in 
determining whether a relationship is entitled to constitutional 
protection, and the purported lack of uniformity between the circuits 
is  mischaracterized as a circuit split as a careful analysis 
demonstrates that there actually is uniformity among the circuits on 
this question.  
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF INTIMATE 
ASSOCIATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN AN ACTION UNDER 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 
The right to freedom of intimate association is a “fundamental 
liberty interest” that is  guaranteed and afforded protection to all 
citizens of the United States under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution.12 Specifically, the “right to freedom of 
intimate association protects an individual's right to enter into and 
maintain certain kinds of highly personal relationships from 
unwarranted state interference.”13  While the right to freedom of 
intimate association is not expressly enumerated nor recognized as a 
fundamental right under the United States Constitution,14 the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that since “individuals draw much 
of their emotional enrichment from close ties to others, an 
individual's freedom and choice to maintain and enter into 
 
12 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
13 Id. at 620.  
14 Id.  
5
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relationships” is a fundamental liberty interest guaranteed to all 
citizens and protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution.15  Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized that an 
individual liberty interest arises from an ability to “freely associate 
and maintain deep personal relationships with others.”16 The basis 
behind the Court’s reasoning was that the ability to associate and 
maintain personal relationships not only facilitates societal 
interaction, but also has an immense impact on shaping an 
individual's beliefs, values, morals, knowledge, and understanding of 
not just society, but themselves as well.17  As a result, since deep 
interpersonal relationships have a profound impact on shaping an  
individual’s identity, an individual who is not afforded the freedom to 
enter into and maintain such relationships will essentially have no 
control over who he or she will become. Thus, it is the ability of an 
individual to associate with others and form deep personal 
relationships is what gives rise to the existence of the fundamental 
liberty interest.18 
As a constitutionally protected liberty interest, an individual's 
right to freedom of intimate association is afforded constitutional 
protection against unwarranted state interference under the Due 
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution which states that, "[n]o state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”19  In order to hold the states 
accountable, and ensure the protection of an individual's 
constitutionally protected rights and liberties, federal law, under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, provides individuals who were unjustly deprived of a 
constitutionally protected right or liberty a remedy for relief by 
imposing liability on state actors whose actions result in an 
unconstitutional deprivation an individual of a constitutionally 
protected right or liberty.20  Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that:  
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
 
15 Id.  
16  Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 619. 
19 U.S. CONST. amend XIV §1. 
20 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2019). 
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or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
was unavailable.21  
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements 
to succeed in an action against a state actor for conduct that 
unconstitutional deprives the plaintiff of his or her constitutionally 
protected right or liberty interest.22  First, the plaintiff, a United States 
citizen, must demonstrate that he or she possessed, and suffered a 
deprivation of, a cognizable constitutionally protected right or liberty 
interest.23  Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate he or she was 
unconstitutionally deprived of that constitutionally protected right by 
a state actor, who was acting in his or her capacity as a state actor, at 
the time of unconstitutional deprivation.24  In other words, in order 
for a plaintiff to satisfy the second prong, a mere demonstration of a 
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or liberty interest by a 
state actor is insufficient.  Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the state actor unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiff of his or her 
constitutionally protected right or liberty interest.25  Thus, in cases 
involving an alleged violation of the right to freedom of intimate 
association, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a state actor's 
 
21 Id.  
22 Robertson, 420 F.3d at 1258.  
23 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).  
24 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
25 Id., see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) 
(discussing that “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any 
government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the 
conscience-shocking level sufficient to constitute a due process violation). 
7
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conduct impeded the plaintiff's ability to enter into and maintain a 
highly personal relationship.26 
Additionally, to satisfy the second element, the plaintiff must 
prove that the state actor was sufficiently culpable in order for the 
state actor's conduct to rise to the level of an unconstitutional 
deprivation.27  In such a case, the plaintiff must prove that the “state 
actor intentionally directed his or her conduct at the plaintiff's 
constitutionally protected relationship.”28  Accordingly, mere 
negligence, or conduct that only incidentally results in a deprivation 
of a constitutionally protected relationship on the part of a state actor, 
is insufficient to satisfy the second element and constitute an 
intentional deprivation on the part of a state actor.29  Thus, even if the 
plaintiff can demonstrate that a state actor's conduct deprived the 
plaintiff of a constitutionally protected relationship, the plaintiff 
would not be able to prevail in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if 
the conduct “negligently or incidentally deprived the plaintiff” of his 
or her right to freedom of intimate association.30  
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
While the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving the 
existence of a parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult 
child, the Court has provided guidance on its interpretation of the 
right to freedom of intimate association.  First, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the right to freedom of intimate association to be a 
fundamental liberty interest afforded protection to all citizens of the 
United States under the due process clause of the Constitution.31  
While the right to freedom of intimate association is not expressly 
enumerated as a fundamental right under the United States 
 
26 See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190; Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48; 
McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 828. 
27 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (holding that mere negligence by a state actor does 
constitute a deprivation under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution). 
28 Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190. 
29 See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 
1190; Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48. 
30 See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 
1190; Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48; Russ, 414 F.3d at 790. 
31 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 
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Constitution, the Supreme Court has interpreted the word “liberty” to 
encompass other rights not enumerated in the Constitution, that have 
been deemed to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and 
“deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions.”32  
In determining whether a right, not expressly enumerated in 
the Constitution, is considered to be fundamental and warrant 
constitutional protection, the Supreme Court has historically based its 
determination on whether the purported right is deep rooted in our 
nation’s history and tradition.  
As a result, the Supreme Court recognized the right to 
freedom of intimate association to be a fundamental liberty interest, 
finding an individual’s ability to freely associate, and enter into deep 
intimate relationships with others to be deeply rooted in United 
States’ history and tradition.  In fact, in determining whether a 
relationship is entitled to constitutional protection under the right to 
freedom of intimate association, the Supreme Court does not limit 
constitutional protection based on the type of relationship or the 
status of a relationship.33   
Instead, the Supreme Court only takes into account the 
objective characteristics of a relationship to determine whether the 
relationship is sufficiently intimate to warrant constitutional 
protection and deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition such 
to give rise to the individual liberty interest that warrants affording 
constitutional protection.34  As a result, the Supreme Court has 
recognized a wide range of rights and liberties, in a variety of 
intimate relationships that it has considered to be deeply rooted in the 
United States’ history and tradition and thus, fall within the scope of 
constitutional protection under the right to freedom of intimate 
association.35 Examples include the right to marry,36 the right to keep 
 
32 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969)); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977). 
33 See Roberts, 486 U.S. at 620. 
34 Id. at 619. 
35 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (recognizing 
unwed father’s right to companionship with his child); Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967) (holding that the freedom to marry was a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982) (discussing that the right to freedom of intimate association was not limited 
to relationships between “members of the nuclear family” and “the tradition of 
uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with 
9
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the family together,37 the right of companionship,38 the right to raise 
one’s child,39 and the right of custody over one’s child.40  
The Court’s broad recognition of the different human 
relationships that may fall within constitutional protection is because 
of the highly personal nature of the bond formed in a relationship that 
gives rise to creation of an individual's liberty interest that 
necessitates affording a relationship constitutional protection under 
the right to freedom of intimate association.41  As a result, the 
objective characteristics the Supreme Court considers to be relevant 
are "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to 
begin and maintain affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical 
aspects of the relationship.”42  Thus, in regard to the types of 
relationships that would qualify to receive constitutional protection 
under the right to freedom of intimate association, the Supreme Court 
has “never felt the need to mark areas of this terrain with any 
precision,”43 and has only limited constitutional protection if a 
relationship does not demonstrate the objective characteristics.44 
IV.  HOW THE SUPREME COURT WOULD EVALUATE A CASE 
INVOLVING THE EXISTENCE OF A PARENTAL LIBERTY 
INTEREST IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ADULT CHILD 
While the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case regarding the 
issue of whether the right to freedom of intimate association exists in 
a relationship between a parent and an adult child, it is clear that, 
based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to freedom of 
intimate association, a child's age alone should not be considered a 
dispositive factor, or even a consideration, in determining if a 
 
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of 
constitutional recognition.”).  
36 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015).  
37 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 753.  
38 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
39 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 
(2000). 
40 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
41 Id. at 620. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 619. 
44 See Roberts, 486 U.S. at 620. 
10
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relationship should be entitled to constitutional protection.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that the right to freedom of intimate 
association exists, and is afforded constitutional protection, because 
highly personal relationships, by nature, “give rise to the formation of 
a personal liberty interest” that necessitates affording a relationship 
with constitutional protection.45  Therefore, the right to freedom of 
intimate association exists due to the fact that highly personal 
relationships give rise to individual liberty.46 As a result, if our nation 
were to adopt a strict limitation and find that a child's age, alone, 
without due consideration to the personal nature of the relationship, 
bars the existence of a parental liberty interest, it would remove the 
very concept of liberty from the question of affording constitutional 
protection.  
Additionally, in determining whether a relationship is entitled 
to receive constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has 
historically only considered the objective characteristics of a 
relationship that it deems demonstrative of giving rise to individual 
liberty to be relevant.47  As a result of the Supreme Court's objective 
approach that focuses on whether a relationship gives rise to the 
individual liberty interest that entitles a relationship to constitutional 
protections, the Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection 
to a broad range of relationships, and does not limit constitutional 
protection based on an external characteristic such as a person's age.48  
However, the fact that age should not be considered a 
dispositive factor in determining if a relationship should be afforded 
constitutional protection does not that age is never a relevant 
consideration.  Indeed, a child's age may have an impact on the level 
of intimacy in a given relationship, if it results in the child no longer 
maintaining a close and personal relationship with his or her parent.  
However, even in that case, the dispositive factor in the Court’s 
determination would still not be based on the age of the child but 
rather, the level of intimacy of the relationship itself..   
Additionally, while one may view the absence of Supreme 
Court recognition of the existence of a constitutionally-protected 
parental liberty interest in relationship with an adult child as 
indicative of the Supreme Court's view that the relationship would 
 
45 Id. at 619. 
46 See id. at 620. 
47 See id. at 620. 
48 See id.  
11
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not rise requisite level of intimacy necessary to afford it with 
constitutional protections, the Supreme Court precedent actually 
indicates the opposite.  There is far more evidence that the Supreme 
Court would support the notion that a relationship between a parent 
and an adult child would demonstrate the requisite level of intimacy 
necessary to afford it with constitutional protection in the absence of 
any contrary or unique circumstances.49  The Supreme Court “has 
long recognized the importance of familial relationships.”50  Notably, 
the Supreme Court has even acknowledged that familial relationships 
“exemplify the objective characteristics” that give rise to the level of 
intimacy that warrants affording a relationship with constitutional 
protection.51 The court reasoned that familial relationships are 
generally characterized by factors such as “as relative smallness,” and 
“seclusion from others in the critical aspects of the relationship, 
which inherently give rise to individual liberty”52 
Furthermore, based on the Supreme Court’s long recognition 
and support of familial relationships, it is evident that “standardizing” 
the right to freedom of intimate association by finding that an 
external characteristic, such as age, bars the existence of a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the relationship between 
two family members would not be supported by the Supreme Court.  
For instance, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,53 the Supreme 
Court held that the City of East Cleveland’s housing ordinance, 
which contained a definitional section that limited the definition of 
“family” to only a few categories of related individuals was 
unconstitutional.54 There, the City of East Cleveland passed a 
housing ordinance, which limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to 
members of a single family and imposed criminal sanctions on any 
person who was found to be in violation of the ordinance.55 
Specifically, the city ordinance limited the definition of a family to 
only the nominal head of the household, his or her spouse, the 
 
49 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (recognizing 
unwed father’s right to companionship with his child); Moore, 431 U.S. at 753.  
50 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
51 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
52 Id. 
53 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
54 Id. at 496.  
55 Id. 
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unmarried children of the head of household or the spouse, and 
parents of the nominal head of the household or the spouse.56  
In that case, Ms. Moore resided in an East Cleveland home 
with her son, Dale, Sr., and Dale, Sr.’s child, Dale, Jr. Following the 
death of Ms. Moore’s daughter, Ms. Moore’s other grandson, John, 
came to live with his grandmother, uncle and cousin.57  The City of 
East Cleveland, after discovering that the two grandchildren were 
cousins, issued Ms. Moore a notice of violation stating that her 
grandson, John, was an illegal occupant and directed her to comply 
with the ordinance.58 After Ms. Moore refused to remove her 
grandson from her home, the City filed criminal charges against Ms. 
Moore for violating the City’s ordinance.59 At trial, Ms. Moore was 
found guilty of violating the City’s ordinance, and sentenced to five 
days in jail and fined twenty-five dollars.60  
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Ms. Moore’s conviction, 
and after the Ohio Supreme Court denied review of her appeal, Ms. 
Moore appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the City of 
East Cleveland’s ordinance was unconstitutional.61 The Supreme 
Court held in favor of Ms. Moore, finding that the City’s ordinance 
violated her constitutional right to live together with her family.62 In 
its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the City’s contention that the 
constitutional right to keep the family together should only apply to 
members of the nuclear family, finding that such a restriction on a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest would force the Court “to 
close its eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with 
the family are accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendments 
due process clause.”63  
Additionally, the Court reasoned that, although it had not 
previously recognized the existence of a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in the relationships between extended family 
members, since the Court has “long recogni[zed] that freedom of 
personal choice and matters of family life is one of the liberties 
 
56 Id. at 552 n.2.  
57 Id. at 497. 
58 Id.  
59 Moore, 431 U.S. at 497.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 497-98. 
62 Id. at 506.  
63 Id. at 501  
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protected by the due process clause,” any decision to limit 
constitutional protection in the context of family rights “at the first 
convenient arbitrary boundary” –such as between members of the 
nuclear family— would be inconsistent with the Due Process 
Clause.64  Instead, the Supreme Court found that the appropriate 
limits on due process “come not from drawing arbitrary lines, but 
rather from careful respect for the teachings of history.”65  As a 
result, since the Supreme Court has long recognized the importance 
of familial relationships and familial relationships are deep rooted in 
our nation’s tradition, the constitution prevented the city from 
enacting a law that set  forth a definition that prevented family 
members from exercising their fundamental right to live together.66  
Thus, since the relationship between members of an extended family 
demonstrates the close ties and bonds necessary to afford 
constitutional protection under the right to freedom of intimate 
association, the Supreme Court found that irrespective of the degree 
of kinship, the choice of relatives to live together may not lightly be 
denied by the state.67  
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland that recognized the existence of an extended family 
member’s constitutionally protected liberty interest to keep the family 
together,68 the Supreme Court would find in favor of the existence of 
a parental liberty interest in the relationship between an adult child.  
First, as was made clear by the Court’s decision in Moore, due to the 
Supreme Court’s long recognition of familial relationships, a mere 
lack of Supreme Court precedent does not serve to bar nor imply the 
nonexistence of constitutionally protected liberty interest between 
two family members.69 Instead, the Supreme Court’s long recognized 
that familial relationships and family life are  deeply rooted tradition 
of our nation.70 As a result, the Court’s recognition demonstrates that, 
even in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, there is an 
established presumption  that the relationship between two families 
 
64 Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-04.  
65 Id. at 503.  
66 Id. at 504. 
67 Id. at 505-06.  
68 Id. at 506.  
69 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504  
70 Id. at 504 
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members is entitled to constitutional protection in the absence of the 
relationship demonstrating any characteristics indicating the contrary.  
Second, since the Supreme Court found any arbitrary 
boundary imposing a limitation on familial constitutional rights is 
inconsistent with the due process clause,71 it is likely that the 
Supreme Court would reject the notion that a bright light standard 
based on a child’s age alone would serve to bar the existence of a 
parental liberty interest.  Third, since the Supreme Court has held that 
the constitutional right to keep the family together may not be denied 
by the state, any attempt by a state to pass a law that interferes with 
that right will be held unconstitutional.72 Thus, since it is likely that if 
a state or local government imposed an ordinance that prevented a 
parent and an adult child from living together, the law would likely 
be found to be in contravention with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Moore.  As a result, the Court has impliedly found that a child’s age 
does not bar the existence of a parental liberty interest as any finding 
to the contrary would pose an unworkable standard based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Moore.  
The Court has also further acknowledged its support of 
affording constitutional protection in familial rights in finding that 
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life to 
be one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”73  Based on the Supreme Court's continued 
recognition and support of familial rights,74 it is evident that the 
absence of Supreme Court recognition of a liberty of a parental 
liberty interest with an adult child, its lack of recognition should not 
be considered to be indicative that Supreme Court would not 
recognize a parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult 
child.  Instead, it is far more likely that the Supreme Court has not 
recognized the existence of a parental liberty interest on grounds that 
such a case has never been heard before it.  The lack of Supreme 
Court guidance should not serve as evidence to support the notion 
that the Supreme Court intended to limit the right to relationships 
between a parent and a minor child. 
Moreover, based on the Supreme Court's long and continued 
support of familial rights, in addition to its interpretation of the right 
 
71 Id. at 502. 
72 See id. at 506.  
73 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
74 Id. 
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to freedom of intimate association, suggests is that the Supreme 
Court would support a finding of a parental liberty interest in the 
relationship with an adult child. Thus, based on the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the right to intimate association, so long as the 
relationship between a parent and an adult child demonstrates the 
objective characteristics, such “as relative smallness,” and “seclusion 
from others in the critical aspects of the relationship” that have been 
recognized by the Supreme Court to give rise to individual liberty.75 
V.  A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT  
While it would appear that there exists a split among the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether a parent has a 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the relationship with his 
or her adult child, the denotation of a circuit split is actually a 
mischaracterization.  In other words, although on its face, it would 
appear as though the circuits have been divided as to whether a 
child's age serves to bar a finding of a parental liberty interest,76 the 
child's age has never been a dispositive factor in the circuit courts' 
decisions.  For instance, in Russ v. Watts,77the Seventh Circuit 
overturned its prior decision, Bell v. City of Milwaukee,78 and found 
that the parent of a twenty-two-year-old child did not suffer an 
unconstitutional deprivation following a chase and subsequent 
altercation with law enforcement that resulted in his son's death.79 
However, the Seventh Circuit's decision to overturn Bell was 
not due to an erroneous finding of the existence of cognizable 
constitutionally protected parental liberty interest with an adult child.  
In Bell, the Seventh Circuit found that the law enforcement officer's 
conduct unconstitutionally deprived the father of his right to freedom 
 
75 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (the Court also recognized characteristics also 
included “a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the 
affiliation, to reflect the considerations that have given rise to the intrinsic element 
of personal liberty.”). 
76 See, e.g., Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830-31; Russ, 414 F.3d at 
791; Butera, 235 F.3d at 656; Robertson, 420 F.3d at 1259; Patel, 305 F.3d at 136; 
Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. d la 
Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999); Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188-89. 
77 414 F.3d at 791. 
78 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1985). 
79 Id. at 784. 
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of intimate association.80  There, the father brought an action against 
the City of Milwaukee alleging that law enforcement officers 
deprived him of his right to maintain the relationship with his twenty-
three-year-old son after his son, following an altercation with law 
enforcement, suffered fatal injuries.81  Indeed, while the facts of Russ 
v. Watts are analogous to those of Bell, the Seventh Circuit did not 
find the decision in Bell, which found in favor of the existence of the 
liberty interest.  Instead, the Seventh Circuit overturned Bell because 
the Bell court found for the plaintiff in a section 1983 action in the 
absence of a state actor intentionally depriving the plaintiff of his 
right to liberty.82  Significantly, in Russ, the Seventh Circuit 
compared its decision in  Bell with the decisions of the other circuits 
which decided cases involving a parental liberty interest under the 
right to freedom of intimate association.83  Notably, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that the distinction between Bell and the 
standard of other circuits was that Bell permitted a parent to prevail 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the state actor's conduct negligently or 
incidentally resulted in the deprivation.84 
The Seventh Circuit also noted a distinct difference between 
the standard established in Bell and the Supreme Court's standard and 
that “the Supreme Court has recognized violations of the due process 
liberty interest in the parent-child relationship only where the state 
took action specifically aimed at interfering with that relationship.”85  
Thus, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, and its sister 
circuits, since under any standard, finding a constitutional violation 
based on official actions that were not directed at the parent-child 
relationship would “stretch the concept of due process far beyond the 
guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court,”  the Seventh 
Circuit decided to overturn its prior decision Bell.86  
However, while the Seventh Circuit overturned Bell, on the 
basis that it was too broad in application as it did not require a finding 
of intent, the Seventh Circuit made it clear that its decision would 
“not establish an absolute rule” that would bar the existence of a 
 
80 Id. at 1239. 
81 Id. at 1215. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 791. 
84 Id. at 788.  
85 Id. at 788 (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331). 
86 Id. at 790.  
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parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child.87  As a 
result, the Seventh Circuit's decision to overturn Bell was not the 
result of an erroneous finding of the existence of a parental liberty 
interest in the relationship with an adult child, but Bell’s allowing a 
plaintiff to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of an 
intentional deprivation by a state actor.88  Thus, while a parental 
liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child no longer exists 
in the Seventh Circuit,  it is clear that the reason is not due to the 
child's age or a different standard than its sister circuits and the 
Supreme Court.89   
Yet, arguably, even circuits which have recognized the 
existence of a constitutionally protected parental liberty interest with 
an adult child, would have reached the same conclusion as the 
Seventh Circuit, in Russ, under those circumstances.  For instance, in 
Trujillo v. Board of Commissioners of Santa Fe County,90 the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Mexico, which dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for 
a failure to allege a constitutionally protected right that would entitle 
the plaintiffs to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.91 There, the plaintiffs, 
the mother and sister of the deceased, brought an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the wrongful death of their adult son and 
brother deprived them of their right to freedom of intimate 
association.92 
The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs both “had a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the relationship with their 
son and brother.”93 In its decision, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged 
the Supreme Court’s broad recognition of liberty interests in familial 
relationships94 and how such relationships, “by their nature, involve 
 
87 Russ, 414 F.3d at 791. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir 1985). 
91 Id. at 1187. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 1189. 
94 See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (holding that a zoning ordinance could not 
prohibit a grandmother from living with her grandsons who are cousins); Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding that foster parents 
have a liberty interest in the relationship with foster children); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
619 (holding that freedom of intimate association protects associational choice as 
well as biological connection).  
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deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other 
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects 
of one's life.”95  Based on the Supreme Court’s broad recognition of 
the existence of constitutionally protected liberty interests in familial 
relationships, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that both the mother and the 
sister had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their 
relationships with the deceased.96 
However, while the Tenth Circuit held that the mother and 
sister had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their 
relationship with the deceased, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court, and dismissed the action for the 
plaintiffs’ failure to include an allegation of the state actor’s intent in 
their complaint demonstrating that the state actor possessed the level 
of intent necessary to give rise to an unconstitutional deprivation 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.97 In its decision, the Tenth Circuit rejected 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell, believing that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent as, 
“their [the Seventh Circuit’s] rationale would permit a section 1983 
claim by a parent whose child is negligently killed in an automobile 
accident with a state official” but would not permit a plaintiff, who is 
not an immediate family member, to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
when a state actor deliberately acted to deprive the plaintiff of his or 
her right to freedom of intimate association.98 As a result, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court of 
the District of New Mexico, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action 
finding that a state actor’s conduct will rise to the level of an 
unconstitutional deprivation of an individual’s right to freedom of 
intimate association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “only if the state actor’s 
conduct was directed at that right.”99  
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit found that, based on Supreme 
Court’s broad recognition of the existence of constitutionally 
protected liberty interests in familial relationships, the mother and 
sister had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the 
relationship with their adult son and brother, the Tenth Circuit found 
 
95 Id. at 1188 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619). 
96 Id. at 1188-89. 
97 Id. at 1191. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
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the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell to be inconsistent with Supreme 
Court precedent for imposing a bright line limitation on the types of 
relationships that would be entitled to receive constitutional 
protection.100 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit also rejected the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell, since it permitted a plaintiff to 
recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of a state actor 
demonstrating the requisite level of intent, deemed to give rise to an 
unconstitutional deprivation under Supreme Court precedent.101  
Therefore, while a parental right to freedom of intimate association 
does not exist in the Seventh Circuit, the decision to overturn Bell v. 
City of Milwaukee, is not due to a circuit split as to whether a parental 
liberty interest exists in the relationship with an adult child, but rather 
that the Seventh Circuit’s decision overturned a standard that was not 
only inconsistent with the precedent of other circuits, but also with 
that of the Supreme Court.  
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to 
freedom of intimate association, and the decisions of each of the 
circuits, a child's age should not be a factor for determining whether a 
relationship is entitled to constitutional protection, and the purported 
lack of uniformity among the circuits is a mischaracterization of a 
circuit split.   
Based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to 
freedom of intimate association, a child’s age should not be 
considered a dispositive factor in determining the existence of a 
parental liberty interest.  While the relationship between a parent and 
an adult child may be inherently different from the relationship 
between a parent and a minor child,102 there is no disputing that the 
relationship between a parent and an adult child is a familial 
relationship. Significantly, the Supreme Court has long recognized 
the importance of familial relationships, and has continuously 
afforded constitutional protection in cases involving the question of 
whether a relationship between family members is entitled to 
constitutional protection under the right to freedom of intimate 
 
100 Id.  
101 Id.   
102 Romana Kaleem, supra note 4, at 1146-48. 
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association.103  This is due to the fact that the Supreme Court has 
found the inherent nature of relationship between family members to 
exhibit the objective characteristics that it has deemed to give rise to 
the requisite level of intimacy necessary to warrant constitutional 
protection.104  
Furthermore, since the relationship between a parent and an 
adult child is a familial relationship, the mere fact that the Supreme 
Court has yet to hear a case involving existence of a parental liberty 
interest in the relationship with an adult child should not bar the 
existence of such a right. The Supreme Court has consistently held 
that when right or liberty interest is considered to be fundamental, it 
is entitled to the constitutional protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.105  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has also found that a right is fundamental when it is considered 
to be deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions.106 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has found that familial relationships 
are deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.107  Thus, since 
the relationship between a parent and an adult child is  a familial 
relationship, deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition, the 
only basis to deny the existence of a parental liberty interest with an 
adult child would be the mere fact that the Supreme Court has yet to 
hear a case involving a child over the age of majority.  Yet, such a 
reason to deny the recognition of a parental liberty interest in the 
relationship with an adult child would be inconsistent with Supreme 
Court precedent as Supreme Court precedent has made it clear that 
any decision to limit constitutional protection in the context of 
familial rights “at the first convenient arbitrary boundary” would be 
inconsistent with the due process clause of the Constitution.108  
While there is a purported “split” amongst the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeal as to whether a parental liberty interest 
exists in the relationship with an adult child, the decisions have been 
mischaracterized as such. In cases involving the right to freedom of 
intimate association between a parent and an adult child, the Second, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits found that the parents had cognizable 
 
103 Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-04. 
104 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
105 Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-04. 
106 Id. 
107 See id.  
108 Id. 
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constitutionally protected liberty interest, while the First, Third, 
Seventh, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits did not find that 
the parents suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of a cognizable 
constitutionally protected liberty interest.109  As a result, the decisions 
of the circuits do not demonstrate a circuit split but rather decisions 
that were decided on other grounds based on the specific 
circumstances of each case.  
However, based on the decisions from each of the circuits, it 
appears as though the divergent outcomes amongst the circuits are 
due to the fact that the circuits have a different opinion as to whether 
parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the 
relationship with their children.  While the First, Third, Seventh and 
Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits did not find that the 
parents suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of a cognizable 
constitutionally protected liberty interest, the decisions were not 
based on the child’s age but rather due the fact that the state actor did 
not demonstrate the requisite level of intent for the parents to prevail 
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.110 As a result, it does not appear 
that the circuits are split on whether a parental liberty interest exists 
in the relationship with an adult child.  
While the recognition of a constitutionally protected parental 
liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child may pose 
questions as to how the courts throughout the United States will be 
able to adopt a workable standard for determining cases where a state 
actor is alleged to have deprived a parent of his or her relationship 
with an adult child, it is likely that the answers already exist in 
Supreme Court precedent.  Indeed, while there are certain parental 
liberty interests that are protected under the right to freedom of 
intimate association, would not be applicable to the relationship 
between a parent and an adult child,111 it is likely that recognition of a 
 
109 Patel, 305 F.3d at 136; Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418, overruled on other grounds by 
Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 n.1; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188-91; Ortiz, 807 
F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830-31; Russ, 414 F.3d at 791; Butera, 235 F.3d 
at 656; Robertson, 420 F.3d at 1259.   
 
111 Based on the nature of the relationship  between a parent and an adult child it is 
likely other parental liberty interests such as the right of a parent to rear his or her 
child, the parental right to exercise custody over his or her child, the parental right 
to make decisions concerning the care custody and management of a his or her 
child, and the parental right to make decisions concerning the care custody and 
control of his or her child would not be conducive to the parent-child relationship.  
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parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child would 
be recognized by the Court under the constitutional right to keep the 
family together and the parental right of companionship.   
Imposing an arbitrary distinction based on a person’s age to 
bar the existence of a fundamental liberty interest that is deep-rooted 
in our nation’s tradition would only serve to bar individual liberty. 
Thus, not only would the recognition of a parental liberty interest in 
the relationship with an adult child be consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, 
but it would serve to ensure that our nation’s laws, and constitutional 
rights, would reflect our nation’s values and traditions. The 
recognition of the right to freedom of intimate association in the 
relationship between a parent and an adult child would not only serve 
to reflect our nation’s history and traditions, but the very concept of 
liberty itself.  
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